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KEVIN THOMAS DUFFY: A MASTERFUL TRIAL
JUDGE
The Honorable P. Kevin Castel
Imagine sitting as a law clerk to a great judge watching him preside at trial.
Any young lawyer in that spot could be forgiven for having a fleeting fantasy
of what it would be like to have that responsibility. There were no grand
delusions about the future, but fate and good fortune stepped in and for
sixteen years that law clerk became the judicial colleague of Judge Kevin
Thomas Duffy on the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York. Today, my friend’s oil portrait hangs in my courtroom. In
tough spots, I ask myself: What would KTD do?
Judge Duffy successfully presided over many of the nation’s most difficult
and significant trials of the late twentieth century. Because of his forty-four
years of judicial service and the declining frequency of parties electing to
proceed to trial, his impressive portfolio of trials will likely stand as a great
achievement as long as the record number of championship rings on the
fingers of Michael Jordan and Tom Brady. This Tribute will review those
trials and focus on some of his unique practices.
But to those who knew him, those trials are not the source of their love and
admiration. He is remembered for his humanity, his disdain for arrogance
and pomposity, and his frequent acts of small kindnesses to others. Many of
his good deeds remain known only to their recipients. Week after week, he
sat at the bedside of his friend, Judge Henry F. Werker, during his final
illness, going over edits to draft opinions. He saw to it that the work of
chambers went smoothly, hiring at least one of Judge Werker’s law clerks as
his own after his friend had passed. Judge Duffy rendered similar assistance
to Judge John E. Sprizzo, taking over the Judge’s lengthy 4pm calendar call.1
Tongue firmly in cheek, Judge Sprizzo claimed that his physical recovery
could be attributed to the host of prayers from members of the bar not
wanting to see Judge Duffy continue at his calendar call. But John Sprizzo



Senior United States District Judge, Southern District of New York. B.S., J.D., St. John’s
University.
1. Longstanding practitioners will remember that the practice of calling a large number
of cases for one set time was known as a “cattle call.” Cases were heard in the sequence that
both sides arrived and “signed in.” Judge Sprizzo took the calendar in open court permitting
lawyers in soon-to-be called cases to observe the Judge dispatching lawyers seeking
needlessly lengthy adjournments. Wise lawyers would mentally modify their requests before
their turn at the podium.
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also privately remarked to this author: “With friends like Kevin Duffy, you
don’t need many friends.”
Judge Duffy was appointed to the district court in 1972 by President
Richard Nixon and retired in September 2016. He is the third-longest serving
judge in the court’s 233-year history. Judge Duffy was born and raised in
the Bronx to an Irish immigrant family under impoverished circumstances.
He attended Fordham University and Fordham University School of Law,
where he met his wife, Irene Krumeich. She later became a Family Court
Judge and an Acting Supreme Court Justice for the State of New York. Judge
Duffy affectionately referred to his wife as the “Real Judge Duffy” or “RJ.”
Young Duffy joined the Second Circuit family more than sixty-five years
ago, while attending law school as an evening student at Fordham. Still a
student, he served as a bailiff to Judge J. Edward Lumbard of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, who became a lifelong
mentor. Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit took a liking to the young
Duffy and gave him memorable advice on writing: “Give us the facts, give
us the law and give it to us in Mother Goose language.”
Following his tenure with Judge Lumbard, he served as an Assistant
United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York, where he tried
nineteen cases. He later became the Assistant Chief of the Criminal Division.
Judge Duffy was the Regional Administrator for the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission in New York, where he oversaw a turbulent
period of consolidation of broker-dealers and framed the proposal for what
became the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC). All in, he
spent fifty-five years in federal public service.
Judge Duffy received many awards,2 but the one that made him smile the
most was his name plate over his favorite booth at Forlini’s on Baxter Street,
signifying his status as a forty-year patron. Along with the accolades, came
24/7 protection courtesy of the United States Marshals Service for a period
exceeding ten years because of his role presiding over several terrorism trials.
I can assure the reader that for Kevin and Irene Duffy, the thrill and mystique
of having a security detail in their home and following their every move wore
off quickly.
With that background, I now present an excerpt from his portfolio of
significant trials:
• Two trials of those involved in the 1993 bombing of the World
Trade Center, a terrorist act that resulted in six deaths and more
than a thousand injured. The first trial lasted six months with more
than a thousand exhibits and the testimony of more than two
hundred witnesses. The second trial lasted three months. All tried
defendants were convicted and the principal defendants received
sentences of 240 years each.
2. He received the William O. Douglas Lifetime Achievement Award from the
Association of Securities & Exchange Commission Alumni, the Emory Buckner Medal from
the Federal Bar Council, the Dean’s Medal from Fordham University School of Law, and an
Honorary Doctor of Humane Letters from the College of New Rochelle.

2022]

A MASTERFUL TRIAL JUDGE

45

•

The three-month Bojinka Plot trial in which defendant Ramzi
Yousef was tried and convicted of conspiring with his uncle
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed of plotting to hijack twelve U.S.bound planes and fly them on a coordinated schedule into the
Pacific Ocean. Today, the plot is acknowledged as a precursor to
the September 11 attacks. Speaking of his work in two terrorism
trials, the circuit wrote as follows: “Judge Duffy carefully,
impartially, and commendably conducted the two lengthy and
extraordinarily complex trials from which these appeals were
taken. The fairness of the proceedings over which he presided is
beyond doubt.”3
• The five-and-one-half-month trial against nine members of the
Gambino Crime Family, including boss Paul Castellano. Two and
a half months into the trial, on December 16, 1985, at
approximately 5:30 p.m., Castellano and his driver were shot and
killed in front of Sparks Steak House in Manhattan. After
extensive questioning of the jurors, Judge Duffy continued the
trial. Six of the remaining defendants were convicted and the
convictions of all were affirmed on most counts.
• The five-month long Brinks Robbery Conspiracy trial. Two
police officers and a private security guard were murdered in
Nanuet, N.Y. in the course of the robbery allegedly organized by
members of the May 19th Communist Organization, the Black
Liberation Army, and the Weather Underground. There were 129
witnesses.
• The trial of Carmine Tramunti, boss of the Lucchese Crime
Family, and fourteen others; six severed defendants were
convicted after a second trial (first trial: two months; second trial:
one month). The original indictment named thirty-two defendants
in thirty counts.
From these and other trials, Judge Duffy leaves a legacy of creative trial
management and a unique style characterized by wit and plain speaking.4
Jury Selection in the World Trade Center Bombing Cases
Judge Duffy’s probing inquiry of potential jurors in the World Trade
Center bombing trials demonstrated his deep commitment to fulfilling the
constitutional promise of a fair and impartial jury. He set a high standard for
those who follow.
In the first World Trade Center bombing trial, one defendant submitted
seventy-nine proposed questions directed to jurors’ feelings about “Islam,

3. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 173 (2d Cir. 2003).
4. Perhaps, the best-known example of his plain speaking was the first paragraph of an
opinion denying a motion to suppress in which the Judge begins with his assessment of the
credibility of a law enforcement witness. The paragraph in its entirety reads as follows: “John
Spurdis is a liar.” United States v. Tramunti, 377 F. Supp. 1, 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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Muslims and Arabs.”5 Judge Duffy was not a fan of jury questionnaires.6
They may lead to avoidable squabbles among parties who are jockeying for
an advantage and a judge’s loss of control over the voir dire process.7 He,
instead, relied on his own methodology for probing possible juror bias.
First, the Judge examined jurors in three groups of fifty to determine
hardship, knowledge of names of witnesses and places, and potential bias
based solely on their knowledge of the general subject matter of the charges,
the bombing of the World Trade Center causing six deaths and more than a
thousand injuries. This round of questioning narrowed the venire from 150
jurors down to sixty.
Next, the Judge examined the sixty in groups of twelve, specifically
focusing on potential bias. These were not superficial inquiries but required
a search of recollection and conscience: “‘If you had to describe your
religious views, how would you do it?’ . . . ‘Have you ever had an incident
in your life that would make it difficult to judge another person because of
their race or creed or color or national origin or anything like that?’” and
“Have you ever moved out of an area because you were disturbed that the
area was changing?”
Finally, each remaining juror was questioned one-by-one on whether the
juror: “(1) had ever traveled to the Middle East; (2) had any feelings about
Israel; (3) would be affected in any way by the fact that the four defendants
were Muslims; (4) had any friends who were Muslims; [and] (5) had any
business dealings with Muslims . . . .” It was only after these and other
inquiries were made, follow-up questions were asked, and challenges for
cause were resolved that the lawyers were required to exercise their
challenges. Judge Duffy showed an admirable unwillingness to rest on a
shallow, perfunctory inquiry.

5. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 120 (2d Cir. 1998). The methodology and
content of Judge Duffy’s questioning of jurors is taken from the circuit’s opinion in Salameh.
6. The author has utilized a juror questionnaire in only one case which was narrowly
tailored to the issues of hardship from jury service and extent of knowledge of the high-profile
defendant. United States v Gotti, No. 08 cr. 1220 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y.) Used that way, it still
had unintended consequences; the press elected to print word for word the responses of some
jurors before they arrived at the courthouse for in-person questioning. Other judges have
reported satisfaction with the use of questionnaires.
7. The differing interests of judges and litigants during voir dire have been discussed by
the Second Circuit in affirming Judge Duffy in a different case:
Court and counsel have somewhat different goals in voir dire. The court wants
a fair and impartial jury to be chosen and to move expeditiously to the
presentation of evidence. Counsel want a jury favorable to their cause—fair or
not—and voir dire aids them in exercising peremptory challenges and
challenges for cause. Counsel have an additional purpose in voir dire moreover
and that involves exposing jurors to various arguments they intend to make at
trial. Counsel view voir dire as an opportunity for advocacy similar to, albeit
not the equivalent of, openings or summations. This additional purpose has led
to a long struggle between bench and bar—in both the state and federal
courts . . . .
United States v. Lawes, 292 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2002).
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The Devil and Daniel Webster: Ruling on an Objection to an Anonymous
Jury
Sequestered juries were not uncommon in state and federal trials but fell
out of favor in the late 1970s. Where there was a tangible basis to believe
that the jury might be subjected to intimidation or worse, courts found that
jurors could be protected without sequestration through a combination of
withholding their identities and providing certain transportation by the
United States Marshals Service.8
Judge Duffy was faced with a request by the government for an
anonymous jury in a trial of defendants on federal conspiracy charges arising
from a series of armored truck robberies and two murders in the Bronx and
Nanuet, NY in 1981 and the prison escape of Black Liberation Army leader
Joanne Chesimard.9 Defendants opposed the government’s application.
The evidence in support of the use of an anonymous jury was formidable.
The trial evidence was expected to include “descriptions of the murders of
four persons,” “recorded conversations in which the defendants discuss
killing two government witnesses,” a “‘Wanted—Dead or Alive’ poster with
a picture of another government witness,” a “reference to witnesses as ‘war
criminals,’” and a “handwritten exhortation prepared by associates of one of
the defendants [stating that] . . . ‘[w]e should also considered [sic] new
tactics—for example, a campaign that targeted individual U.S. Attorneys or
grand jurors and holds them accountable for the impact of their actions.’”10
The Judge’s grant of the motion was not surprising, but his chosen words
were vintage Duffy:
The defense . . . suggests that they will be unable to select a jury if denied
the venireman’s name, address, and place of employment . . . . It is true
that the defendants will be unable to get the exact jury they want. That is
not required by the law. And in any event, the one recorded situation in
American literature known to the Court in which a party got exactly
the jury he wanted—he lost. See S. BENET, The Devil and Daniel
Webster, THIRTEEN O’CLOCK (1937).11

The Murder of the Reputed Boss of the Gambino Crime Family During a
Multi-Defendant Trial
There is no single source of trial management difficulties in a criminal
trial. They may be caused by jointly trying defendants with antagonistic
defenses, the sheer volume of charges or evidence, or the occurrence of the
unexpected. Cases with these types of complexities seemed to find their way
on to Judge Duffy’s docket.

8. See United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 141–43 (2d Cir. 1979). The Second Circuit
approved the use of an anonymous jury in the trial of alleged drug kingpin Leroy “Nicky”
Barnes presided over by Judge Henry F. Werker, Judge Duffy’s good friend.
9. United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 846 (2d Cir. 1985).
10. United States v. Shakur, 623 F. Supp. 1, 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
11. Id. at 4.
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In a case indicted by the grand jury and ultimately assigned to Judge Duffy,
there were seventy-eight counts against twenty-four defendants, alleging
eleven different conspiracies relating to the affairs of the Gambino Crime
Family.12 The Judge severed counts and defendants and proceeded to trial
of the first phase.
Paul Castellano aka Big Paulie, the reputed head of the Gambino Crime
Family, and others were on trial in the first phase on a total of twenty-three
counts arising from a stolen car conspiracy. Two and one-half months had
passed and there was much more testimony to come. The level of press
coverage was high and on Friday, December 13, 1985 with the weekend at
hand, the Judge told the jurors to go home, relax, and confine their television
viewing to sports, suggesting Monday Night Football’s Miami DolphinsNew England Patriots game.13
Big Paulie and one other were gunned down by three men in front of
Sparks Steakhouse in mid-Manhattan that Monday. It was a major story.
During the Miami Dolphins game, there was a crawl at the bottom of the
screen with the news and it was front page news the next day.14 This is a
trial judge’s worst nightmare. Loss of life aside, two and one-half months
had been invested in the trial. Now it might all be for naught. Predictably,
the remaining defendants moved for a mistrial. Judge Duffy will tell you
what happened next:
On December 17, 1985, the day after Castellano was killed, I conducted a
separate voir dire of each juror . . . . All of the jurors knew of Castellano’s
death and basically how it came about. Approximately six of the jurors
also had heard something to the effect that Castellano had been the head of
organized crime. Without exception, however, none of the jurors had heard
anything about the remaining nine defendants or about the trial, other than
the fact that Castellano had been a defendant in it. The jurors all stated that
they would still be able to decide the case fairly and impartially and that
what they had learned about Castellano would in no way affect their ability
to judge the other defendants.15

The Judge directed counsel to collect the media reports, including
transcripts of broadcasts, and adjourned the trial and set oral argument on the
motion for a mistrial for January 6, 1986. At the argument, the Judge noted
that (1) the publicity was prejudicial to the defendant and (2) it became
known to jurors. These circumstances met only the first two prongs of the
Second Circuit’s test in United States v. Lord.16 The third prong required
12. United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 1987).
13. Don Shula’s Dolphins prevailed over the Patriots 30-27. See New England Patriots at
Miami Dolphins - December 16th, 1985, PRO FOOTBALL REFERENCE, https://www.profootball-reference.com/boxscores/198512160mia.htm [https://perma.cc/W3GS-7QG2] (last
visited Mar. 23, 2022).
14. Mafia’s Number One Blown Away, N.Y. POST, Dec. 17, 1985, at 2; Robert D.
McFadden, Organized-Crime Chief Shot Dead Stepping From Car on E. 46th St., N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 1985, at A1, col. 2
15. United States v. Gaggi, 632 F. Supp. 1019, 1020–21 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 811 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1987).
16. 565 F.2d 831, 838 (2d Cir. 1977).
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that an exposed juror be questioned out of the presence of other jurors “to
determine the extent of the exposure and its effect on the juror’s attitude
toward the trial.”17 Judge Duffy described his approach to the third step:
The voir dire of the individual jurors lasted the entire day on January 7,
1986. I found the jurors to be sincere and candid in their responses to
detailed questions regarding what they had seen or heard since Castellano’s
death and what their present impressions were as to the remaining
defendants. The jurors exhibited a conscientious desire to avoid the
publicity regarding this case and an insightful understanding of the
irrelevance of any publicity that they were exposed to. Not one juror heard
or saw anything that gave him or her the impression that the remaining nine
defendants were involved in organized crime. In fact, no one heard or saw
anything at all about the remaining nine defendants or the trial.18

He denied the motion for a mistrial and issued written findings. On appeal,
the Second Circuit noted “that the trial court complied in every respect with
this Circuit’s guidelines”:19
Once it saw ‘a potential for unfair prejudice,’ it held, not one but two, voir
dires of each juror outside the presence of other jurors, to determine the
extent of the juror’s exposure to the reports and its effect on his or her
attitude toward the remaining defendants. Under these circumstances, the
measures taken by the district court were adequate to insure a fair trial. 20

Of the original nine defendants (other than the murdered Castellano),
Judge Duffy dismissed the charges against one defendant at the close of the
government’s case and two were acquitted. The acquittals powerfully
illustrated the jury’s ability to follow the Judge’s instructions and fairly and
impartially assess the guilt or lack of guilt of the defendants based solely on
the evidence at trial.
Robinson Crusoe and The Bully: Other Examples of Use of Language with
Jurors
Judge Duffy understood that jurors are often anxious about whether they
will understand unfamiliar legal jargon. He often would break the ice during
jury selection by promising the jurors that during the trial he would not allow
the lawyers to use any words longer than “delicatessen.”
In framing directions to jurors, Judge Duffy would ask jurors to imagine
themselves or their family members sitting at one of the tables in the well of
the courtroom facing a trial: “Wouldn’t you want jurors who only considered
the evidence brought out in this Courtroom?” The substance of his
17. Id. at 83839.
18. Gaggi, 632 F. Supp. at 1022.
19. Gaggi, 811 F.2d at 52.
20. Id. Of the six defendants who were convicted, two had their convictions under the
counts alleging a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241 set aside because the government failed to prove
they were citizens, a necessary predicate under the statute; the convictions on other counts
were otherwise affirmed.
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instruction may not have been different from that given by other judges but
his language choice—placing the juror in the picture—made it more
impactful.
In crafting the final instructions to the jury, Judge Duffy was not content
to use a bland hypothetical for explaining circumstantial evidence.21 Instead,
he would take the jurors on a vivid mental journey to a desert island, and he
managed to work himself into the story:
[Do you r]emember at the beginning of trial I gave you an example of
circumstantial evidence? I told you about Robinson Crusoe and the fact
that I had to do a book report in the second year of high school on that. I
told you that he was ship wrecked and ended up on a desert island that was
totally uninhabited. He knew it was uninhabited because he had been all
over the desert island and he could find nobody else there. One day, he
goes down to the shore, and there in between the line where the tide had
been and where the water was when he arrived was a big set of size 13D
footprints. Robinson Crusoe had 9s. He walked over. He said, they are
not mine. That’s circumstantial evidence. Of what? Of the fact that
somebody else is on the island. If the issue [was] is the island totally
uninhabited except for Robinson Crusoe, do you think he would have any
difficulty in figuring out that somebody else was there? Do you think he
did? No, of course not, from circumstantial evidence, he drew the inference
that somebody else was on the island. 22

The Second Circuit viewed the Robinson Crusoe hypothetical as “entirely
appropriate.”23 But the Judge’s instruction continued with an example about
the school bully:
When you were a kid and you were in school, do you remember there was
a bully. There was a bully in every kid’s class, I am sure of it. Some kid,
he’d come along and he’d step on the toe of the person beside him. The
victim would yell. And the bully would look at the teacher and say, oh, it
was a mistake. I didn’t mean to do that. That was an accident. Every other
kid in the neighborhood knew that it was no mistake. Right?
The direct evidence would be his declaration that it was a mistake and an
accident. But by circumstantial evidence, ladies and gentlemen, you knew
that it wasn’t a mistake. It was him being a bully. You know, grown-ups
are just big kids. We think the same way. You can conclude from
circumstantial evidence what someone’s intent or knowledge was. Direct
evidence i[s] often misleading. Circumstantial evidence is quite sufficient.

21. To explain circumstantial evidence, trial judges frequently use the example of a
hypothetical courtroom with the draperies drawn tightly closed so no one can look out. Into
the courtroom walks a person with a dripping umbrella. Later a person enters with a raincoat
with water spotting on the shoulders. Jurors are told from this combination of facts that it
would be reasonable to infer that it had been raining. Despite its prevalent use, not all judges
have been fans of the example. United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 13 n.7 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“I never know how that is helpful to a jury. You are not really trying to decide whether some
weather condition exists . . . .”) (quoting Judge Thomas P. Griesa).
22. United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 141 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998) (alteration in original)
(quoting the trial transcript).
23. Id. at 140.
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One thing you should recognize, it still must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.24

While the circuit disapproved of the instruction because it started
from the premise that the “kid” was in fact a bully,25 it found no prejudice in
the overall context of the charge and affirmed.26 This author submits that
Judge Duffy was on the right track in endeavoring to make the instructions
come alive for lay jurors. Innovators do not always succeed on their first
attempts. Judges should be inspired by Judge Duffy’s example to put thought
into crafting jury instructions that use language and storytelling to explain
opaque legal concepts.
In one lengthy trial (in which this author was present as law clerk), there
was a suggestion that jurors may have seen certain defendants in handcuffs.
The Judge could not exclude the possibility that this had occurred, but no
party requested that he question the jurors, which might only serve to
highlight the issue. Instead, he delivered an instruction that largely took the
sting out of the possibility of an accidental sighting. In the words of the
circuit affirming Judge Duffy:
[T]he instruction quite appropriately point[ed] out that the reason for some
defendants (not identified by the court) being in custody while others were
not was that some defendants were able to afford bail and others were not
and that the jury was to draw no inference from whether or not a defendant
was able to afford bail. The inquiry made and the curative charge together
served, we think, to supplant the voir dire of the allegedly exposed jurors.27

Because the Judge’s folksy style was not lifted from a hornbook or style
manual, his language choices could lead to appellate issues. The following
is an excerpt from a voir dire of a juror who had a family member in law
enforcement:
THE COURT: Now, there will be people coming in here who are with law
enforcement. Do you think because there is a person in your household
that’s also law enforcement that you might be biased towards them? Let
me put it to you this way. Have you ever gotten a ticket?
JUROR: Yes.
THE COURT: Now, as the cop was walking away did you question
whether his parents were actually married?
JUROR: No.
THE COURT: Could you recognize that people are people, no matter what
they are?
JUROR: Yes.

24. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting the trial transcript).
25. A second unmentioned problem is how “[e]very other kid in the neighborhood” knew
he was a bully and why this was not akin to endorsing the use of propensity evidence.
26. See id. at 142–43.
27. United States v. Taylor, 562 F.2d 1345, 1359 (2d Cir. 1977) (citing United States v.
Acosta-Garcia, 448 F.3d 395, 396 (9th Cir. 1971)).
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THE COURT: Do you think you have any problem with that at all?
JUROR: No.28

While not endorsing this unorthodox line of inquiry, the circuit majority
nevertheless affirmed, noting the broad discretion afforded a trial judge.29
Jury Entering: Remain Seated
In pre-pandemic times, it was the near uniform practice of judges to require
parties and counsel to stand when the jury entered or exited the courtroom.
Jurors were told that this was a sign of respect to them as judges of the facts.30
But Judge Duffy did not follow convention. He required parties and
lawyers to remain seated while the jury was entering and existing the
courtroom. He explained that his practice was born of experience:
Simply put, while I was still an active litigator, my opponent was standing
while the jury was walking from the courtroom, and he inadvertently
stepped on the forelady’s toe, stumbling into her and almost knocking her
down. I wondered whether the successful result my client obtained in that
case was due to abilities of counsel or to the toe-stubbing inflicted by my
opponent.31

In the civil case in which the Judge described the origins of his contrarian
practice, the lawyer violated the Judge’s direction to remain seated as the jury
exited for the apparent purpose of displaying his displeasure at one of the
Judge’s rulings and provoking a mistrial. The Judge found the lawyer, who
had not been admitted to the bar of the court pro hac vice or otherwise, to be
in contempt but later vacated the finding noting that “there is little time to be
wasted on the antics of people like [this]. It would add nothing to the dignity
of this court to continue this proceeding.”32 Along the way, the Judge also
took a jab at those he felt took too narrow of a view of a court’s contempt
power: “I do recognize that for at least some appellate judges, contempt is a
tightly choreographed minuet where a trial judge can be reversed for any
missed step or missed beat.”33
Conclusion
It takes a special person to excel at a job that requires you to sit passively,
listen intently, and exude optimism. This is especially hard when you are
watching strategic errors by trial lawyers, listening to testimony that you
heard before, and harboring your own concerns about how the pace of the
trial will affect the jury. There are lofty aspects to the position, but it is still
a job. Yet few jobs come with an array of other folks who are paid to probe,
28. See United States v. Lawes, 292 F.3d 123, 133 (2d Cir. 2002) (Pooler, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 128 (majority opinion).
30. The practice has been suspended under certain COVID-19 protocols in order to avoid
unnecessary movement.
31. Santa Maria v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 879 F. Supp. 10, 11 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
32. Id. at 13.
33. Id.
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uncover, and present your actual or perceived errors. The finest moments
and biggest gaffs of trial judges are on public display long after their demise.
Wise trial judges appreciate that they are privileged to be seated in the front
row as life’s dramas unfold—and often participate in how the stories end.34
It is endlessly fascinating, challenging, and rewarding.
Kevin Duffy had the right disposition for the job. He understood that a
good trial judge does not strive to be the star of the show. Instead of raising
his voice when displeased, he lowered it to a faint whisper requiring all to
strain to hear him. The message could be a tough warning, but he usually
secured immediate and complete compliance.35 He understood that most
trial management issues should be resolved with one-part case law36 and twoparts intuition and experience.
No judge will ever be quite like Judge Duffy, nor should anyone strive to
copy his unique style. He would be the first to tell you of his own
imperfection. Perfect trials are rare and perfect judges are nonexistent. But
my good fortune was to benefit from his wisdom as a law clerk and then as a
friend and valued colleague on the bench. Those whose lives he touched all
have stories to tell.

34. The front row seat metaphor comes from the late District and Circuit Judge Joseph M.
McLaughlin, former dean of Fordham Law School. Judge Sprizzo preferred to compare a trial
judge to the narrator in Geoffrey Chaucer’s The Canterbury Tales where pilgrims would stop
along the way to recount their travails before continuing their journey.
35. Among his quips in chastising lawyers were: “If you pull that stunt again, you’ll get
to know your client really well” or “If you plan to try that again, remember to bring your
toothbrush.” Both were intended as cryptic refences to the possibility of incarceration for
contempt.
36. The Judge was inventive in his use of case law. He would cite In re Rachmones, when
a case cried out for compassion or mercy (using the Yiddish word for same). Judge Cathy
Seibel of the Southern District of New York recalls him citing In re Toyota, harkening to the
advertising slogan “You want it, you’ve got it, Toyota,” as a warning that the proffered
evidence might be opening an evidentiary door that she may latter regret.
In fairness, Judge Duffy, his colleagues, and his law clerks did not have access to
computerized research tools in his early years on the bench. This author, from his days as law
clerk, can attest that finding a case law answer to a specific case management issue utilizing
the West Key Number system is close to impossible.

